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Sadeghi et al.: Updates from the Regional Human Rights Systems

UPDATES FROM THE REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS
African Regional &
Sub-Regional Systems
African Commission Recognizes the
Darfurians as a People
A decision released in July 2010 by the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights is the latest in the Commission’s
attempts over several decades to address
widespread human rights violations in the
Southern and Darfur regions of Sudan. In
a 1999 decision, the Commission found the
government of Sudan had committed widespread human rights violations throughout
Sudan between 1989 and 1993. In 2005, the
Commission passed a resolution urging the
government to comply with its obligations
under international agreements, including
the Constitutive Act of the African Union,
the United Nations Charter, and the African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and
to desist from attacks against the Darfurian
people. The latest decision once again finds
widespread violations and, most significantly, expands the jurisprudence on Sudan
by recognizing Darfurians as a people with
standing to claim collective rights under the
African Charter.
The Center on Housing Rights and
Evictions (COHRE), a Geneva-based international NGO, filed its communication
with the Commission in 2003 against the
government of Sudan for mass violations
of the African Charter. In that year, armed
groups including the Sudan Liberation
Army/Movement and the Justice and
Equality Movement, rebelled against the
government of Sudan, reacting to its marginalization and underdevelopment of the
Darfur region. The government of Sudan
suppressed the uprising by sponsoring
the Murhaleen and Janjaweed militias,
which have targeted civilian populations,
destroyed and contaminated water wells,
and forcibly evicted thousands by razing homes and entire villages, leading to
mass displacement. Based on these actions,
COHRE alleged that the government of
Sudan violated Articles 4-7, 12, 14, 16, 18,
and 22 of the African Charter. These articles include, respectively, the general duty
of member states to recognize the Charter
rights and give them effect in domestic

legislation, as well as the specific rights to
life and integrity of person; to dignity; to
liberty and security of person; to be heard;
to freedom of movement and residence
within a state; to property; to family, obliging the state to protect the family’s physical
and moral health; and to economic, social,
and cultural (ESC) development.
The government of Sudan protested
the admissibility of the communication
for failure to exhaust local remedies. The
Commission, however, agreed with the
petitioner’s assertion that because the government is aware of widespread human
rights violations but provides no recourse,
local remedies are “unavailable, ineffective and insufficient,” and found the
Communication admissible. On the merits
of the communication, Sudan denied the
allegations, blaming the Darfur situation
largely on the instability and interference
of neighboring states such as Chad and
the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sudan
claimed that through the Darfur Peace
Agreement of May 2006, it has already
begun addressing any human rights violations. However, the agreement has generally failed to achieve its intended goals,
including peace or wealth and power-sharing for the Darfur region.
In its analysis, the Commission relied
on its own precedent, precedent from the
European Court of Human Rights, and
UN and NGO reports to hold that the
government of Sudan had violated Articles
1, 4-7, 12(1), 14, 16, 18(1), and 22. The
Commission made several important recommendations for the government of
Sudan to remedy or address these violations, including to provide remedies for
victims, investigate abuses, create the economic and social infrastructure that would
allow for the safe return for internally
displaced persons and refugees, establish a National Reconciliation Forum to
address the long-term sources of conflict,
“undertake major reforms of its legislative
and judicial framework,” and “desist from
adopting amnesty laws for perpetrators for
human rights abuses.”
The decision notably discusses Article
22, the right to economic, social, and
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cultural (ESC) development, whose incorporation in the African Charter is unique
among the regional systems. Article 22
provides that
1. All peoples shall have the right
to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard
to their freedom and identity and
in the equal enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind. 2. States
shall have the duty, individually or
collectively, to ensure the exercise
of the right to development.
The Commission found that the
Darfurian people had been denied the
opportunity to engage in ESC activities
because of government-sponsored attacks
and forced displacement, which violated
their right to ESC development. Rather
than further elaborate the substantive right
to ESC development, the Commission
focused on analyzing the necessary precondition to qualify for this right under the
Charter: designation or recognition as “a
people,” since the right to ESC development is one of the collective rather than
individual rights recognized in the Charter.
As in previous decisions, the Commission
used the characteristics by which a people
self identify, including “language, religion,
culture . . . territory . . . history, [and]
ethno-anthropological factors.” It also recognized that race and ethnicity can identify
a people in a multi-racial state.
In recognizing Darfurians as a people,
the Commission has increased their ability to claim other collective rights such as
self-determination. In Katangese Peoples’
Congress v. Zaire, the Commission held that
for a people to exercise the right to external
self-determination, they must have suffered
massive human rights violations. While the
Commission has in the COHRE decision
recognized both the Darfurians as a people
and found the state responsible for massive
human rights violations, it is unclear whether
the Commission would hold in the future that
Darfurians meet its high threshold for a right
to self-determination through secession.
Sarira Sadeghi, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, wrote this
column for the Human Rights Brief.
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Colloquium on African Human
Rights System Aims at New Era of
Communication and Cooperation
Delegates from Africa’s principal judicial and quasi-judicial human rights institutions met in early October 2010 in Arusha,
Tanzania to reflect on the ongoing evolution of mechanisms for the protection and
promotion of human rights on the continent. Participants included the continental
bodies — the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights and African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights — as
well as some of the various sub-regional
bodies authorized to adjudicate human
rights issues, such as the East African
Court of Justice (EACJ), the Tribunal
of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), and the Court of
Justice of the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS).
The first of its kind in Africa, the
Colloquium of African Human Rights
Courts provided a crucial and heretofore
absent forum in which the participants
could deliberate and air common concerns. In their Final Communiqué, the
participants agreed, among other things, to
hold colloquia every two years, evidencing
that the various institutions have prioritized cooperative dialogue on procedural
and substantive matters of joint interest.
This commitment to close relations may
assuage realistic fears that these human
rights courts will come into conflict over
jurisdiction or the interpretation of common human rights instruments, such as the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights. It suggests these institutions recognize that a unified, coherent jurisprudence
is integral to the success of human rights
imperative in Africa.
Of fundamental importance is the
relationship between the two continental
bodies, the African Commission and the
African Court. As the preamble to its
Protocol indicates, the African Court was
founded to “complement and reinforce
the functions of the African Commission”
in furtherance of the Commission’s three
mandates to promote, protect, and interpret
human rights. The Protocol establishes in
Article 5.1 the entities that may bring cases
to the African Court, the first of which is
the African Commission. While there are
other possible entities — states, NGOs,
and individuals — the Commission will
likely be the main source of referrals in

this formative stage of the Court’s evolution. States are not likely to bring cases
against other states or against themselves,
and NGOs and individuals can only have
access to the Court if their home state has
filed a special declaration granting permission. To date, only four states have issued
such a declaration. Further emphasizing
the Commission’s role as a gate-keeper,
when cases are brought directly by NGOs
or individuals, Article 6.1 of the Protocol
outlines the Court’s right to request the
opinion of the Commission on preliminary
questions of admissibility. Given the complementary and cooperative roles played
by the two bodies, their respective rules
of procedure ought to be harmonized to
improve efficient and consistent outcomes
for petitioners.
The relationship of the African Court
to the various sub-regional courts also
requires careful consideration. While their
existence as able adjudicators and symbols
of regional unity is integral to the success of human rights initiatives in Africa,
the sub-regional courts share a mandate
similar to that of the African Court, and
there is a resulting risk of overlapping
subject matter jurisdiction. Discussions at
the Colloquium primarily aimed to diminish concerns that these courts might issue
differing or even conflicting interpretations
of the relevant human rights instruments.
The Danish Institute for Human Rights
has suggested granting the African Court
appellate authority to hear and interpret
questions of law in cases adjudicated by
the sub-regional bodies. The courts might
also explore an arrangement whereby the
sub-regional courts are permitted to refer
questions of interpretation to the African
Court, which would then issue an advisory
opinion.
Given the complexity of Africa’s evolving human rights regime, achieving harmony among the various institutions will
be a considerable and protracted undertaking. There is hope that the Colloquium has
both symbolically and substantively laid
the foundation for this effort, and that the
agreement to hold future colloquia marks
the beginning of an enduring commitment
to exchange agendas and working methods, experiences, and views of common
issues. As the network evolves, however,
the obstacle will likely not arise from a
lack of will so much as a lack of funding
and resources sufficient, for example, to
facilitate in-person meetings or sustain
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an efficient, technologically modern communication network. The Commission, for
example, is highly dependent on support
from various donors for its operations, and
those donations are frequently earmarked
for specific projects. Within this context,
cooperation must not only be effective,
but must also be able to adjust to whatever
funds and resources are available.
Christopher Tansey, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of Law,
covers the African regional and sub-regional
systems for the Human Rights Brief.

European Court of Human Rights
European Court of Human Rights
Upholds Turkish Journalist’s
Right to Freedom of Expression
On September 14, 2010, in a unanimous
Chamber decision upholding the right to
freedom of expression, the European Court
of Human Rights ruled that Turkish authorities violated Articles 2, 10, and 13 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
Dink v. Turkey examined the case of
Firat Dink, a Turkish journalist of Armenian
origin who was shot three times in the head
in January 2007. The Court held that the
Turkish State violated Article 2 for failing
to protect Dink’s right to life and for ineffectively investigating his murder; Article
10 for unjustly interfering with Dink’s
right to freedom of expression; and Article
13 for failing to effectively investigate the
killing.
Dink, who took the pen name Hrant
Dink, wrote frequently for a TurkishArmenian weekly newspaper about the
plight of Turkish-Armenian citizens. He
firmly believed that Turkish citizens of
Armenian origin share a conflicted view
of their own history. In a series of articles published between 2003 and 2004,
Dink wrote that “Armenians’ obsession for
Turkey to recognize their status as victims
of genocide has become their raison d’être,
but Turkey has treated this need with indifference, and thus, the suffering of the
Armenians remains an ongoing issue.” In
Dink’s eighth article, while discussing the
relationship between Turkish-Armenians
and Turkish society as a whole, he wrote
that “the purified blood that will replace
the blood poisoned by the ‘Turk’ can be
found in the noble vein linking Armenians
to Armenia.”
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In context, the quote expressed how
the Turkish-Armenian perception of the
Turkish state had disintegrated to the point
of poisoning their ability to interact with
and engage in Turkish society. But the
bravado of Dink’s rhetoric caught the attention of the Turkish government. In 2004,
the public prosecutor brought criminal
proceedings against Dink under article 301
of the Turkish Criminal Code, which criminalizes the denigration of “Turkishness.”
The Turkish court convicted Dink of denigrating Turkish identity, despite contextual
evidence in his columns suggesting the
contrary.
On February 17, 2006, during Dink’s
appeals process within the Turkish court
system, an informant alerted Turkish
authorities to an assassination plot. The
Istanbul police knew the names of potential suspects and yet did nothing, failing
to alert Dink of any credible or imminent
threat. Eleven months later, a 17-year-old
Turkish extremist national shot Dink in
the head.
That the Court upheld Dink’s right to
freedom of expression even after his death
is an important finding. After reviewing
eight of his controversial articles, the Court
found Dink’s use of “the impugned expression showed clearly that what he described
as ‘poison’ had not been ‘Turkish blood,’ as
held by the [Turkish] Court of Cassation,
but the ‘perception of Turkish people’
by Armenians and the obsessive nature
of the Armenian diaspora’s campaign to
have Turkey recognise [sic] the events
of the 1915 genocide.” The Court clarified that, according to prior case law, the
right to freedom of expression under the
Convention can only be infringed under a
three-part conjunctive test. Namely, if the
infringement is prescribed by law, pursues
a “legitimate aim,” and can be regarded
as “necessary in a democratic society.”
The Court focused its analysis on the third
prong of the test and reiterated its position that Article 10 “prohibit[s] restrictions
on freedom of expression in the sphere
of political debate and issues of public
interest.” The Court further observed that
Dink’s writings were in his capacity as
a journalist, on an issue of public concern. Lastly, the Court maintained that
seeking historical truth is an “integral
part of freedom of expression.” Balancing
Dink’s interests against those of the State,
the Court held that “Fırat Dink’s conviction for denigrating Turkish identity had

not answered any ‘pressing social need.’”
Turkey had therefore violated Dink’s right
to freedom of expression.
The Court ordered Turkey to pay Dink’s
family approximately €133,000 in nonpecuniary damages and court costs. The
Turkish State will not appeal the decision.
Eighteen total suspects are still on trial in
Turkey at the time of this writing, including Ogün Samast, the main suspect in the
assassination, who will be tried in juvenile
court.
But the Turkish-Armenian citizens who
so fervently supported Dink will feel vindicated only if Turkey complies with the
Court’s decree. The Turkish ministry said
it would implement provisions of the judgment and take measures to prevent similar
violations in the future. If so, generations
of Turkish journalists might finally know
the true comforts of free speech, and not
have to fear unjust prosecution. Then, Dink
will achieve in martyrdom what he was just
beginning to convey as editor-in-chief of
Agos, the bilingual weekly newspaper that
still features its former boss, relaxed and
smiling, prominently on its website.

Sudsidiarity and the European
Court: A Solution for NonCompliance?
The European Court of Human Rights
risks drowning under a massive case
load unless the national courts of EU
member states and legislators show more
respect for the Court’s judgments, said
Christos Pourgourides, Chairperson of
the Committee on Legal Affairs for the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe (PACE). In his speech, delivered
October 1, 2010, in Skopje, Macedonia,
Mr. Pourgourides called upon members of
the European Council to adopt the idea of
subsidiarity, a principle that requires the
judicial systems of each member state to
acknowledge the judgments of the Court.
Such adherence would both enhance the
notion of human rights and, over time, limit
repetitive cases before the Court.
Pourgourides cited two egregious
examples of repetition that could have
been curbed through adherence to the subsidiarity principle. In a 1979 case, Marckx
v. Belgium, the Court held that children
born out of wedlock must not be discriminated against, but such discrimination was
not officially condemned in France until
Mazurek v. France in 2000, when the Court
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upheld the inheritance rights of a man born
out of wedlock. Also, in 1981 the Court
held in Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom
that homosexual acts between consenting adults in the United Kingdom must
not be criminalized, but these acts were
not decriminalized in Cyprus until 1993,
when the Court heard Modins v. Cyprus.
In resisting Court precedent, the Cyprus
government said its court acted before
the implications of Dudgeon were properly understood. “Such practice is simply
unacceptable if we agree that the common
objective of all parties to the Convention,
under its first article, is to ‘secure’ the
rights and freedoms laid down in the
[European Convention on Human Rights],”
Pourgourides said in his speech.
Subsidiarity is an organizational belief
that decisions are best made in the lowest levels of government as opposed to at
a supranational level. In this context of
judicial organization, there is a reliance on
each member state to uphold the judgments
of the Court, so that similar claims from
multiple jurisdictions will not be heard.
Since the Treaty on the European Union
established the principle of subsidiarity as
a general rule in 1992, proponents such as
Mr. Pourgourides have spoken to its value.
His remarks were delivered at a conference called “Strengthening Subsidiarity
– Integrating the Court’s Case-Law into
National Law and Judicial Practice.” The
aim of subsidiarity is not to restrict the
power of the Court, but to make it more
efficient. However, subsidiarity is not an
immediate fix. Its practice would first
require cooperation among all member
states and generations of patience.
However, it is unlikely that subsidiarity will completely solve the Court’s case
overload. By most accounts, the Court’s
pending caseload exceeds 100,000 applications and continues to grow. For example,
the Court received more than 50,000 new
applications in 2008, but rendered only
30,000 admissibility decisions and less
than 2,000 judgments. “Such a disparity
is a double-edged sword for the Court,”
said members of the International Law
Discussion Group in a 2009 meeting at
London’s Chatham House. The primary
problem acknowledged during the meeting
is that “many repetitive, but well-founded
cases still go to Strasbourg when they
should have been dealt with at the national
level. The result is that Strasbourg has
become the agent for effecting change in
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society. This is both painful for the country
concerned and crippling for the Court.”
Although Strasburg has become an
agent for shaping societal change, some
countries are not eager to integrate the
Court’s judgments into their own case law
because inaction is far easier. Moreover,
the biggest hurdle in the implementation of
subsidiarity is that even though the Court’s
judgments can be reasonably described as
“persuasive authority,” all parties of the
Convention are not bound by its decisions
and can easily hide behind the case-by-case
nature of the Court.
Mr. Pourgourides has proposed some
practical steps toward implementation.
First, national legislatures and courts must
be made aware of the Court’s case law
through translations and comprehensive
reviews in legal journals. Second, national
parliaments must closely follow the evolution of the Court’s case law. Third, the
highest national courts must ensure lower
courts are aware of and respect the Court’s
case law. Fourth, dialogue between the
Court and member states must be constant
and facilitated by third parties. Fifth, member states must learn more about key cases
whose significance extends beyond the
country that has been found in violation.
Whether Mr. Pourgourides’ suggestions
bear fruit will not be known until long after
he retires from his duties. He has, at least,
outlined a starting point for success and
perhaps the most substantive solutions to
the Court’s most pressing threat.
Michael Becker, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
the European Court of Human Rights for the
Human Rights Brief.

Inter-American System
Inter-American Court to Hear
First Case on Discrimination Based
on Sexual Orientation
On September 17, 2010, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) submitted the unprecedented
case of Chilean judge Karen Atala to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(Inter-American Court). In her petition,
Atala alleges discrimination based on
sexual orientation in the custody case of
her children. The Chilean Supreme Court
granted permanent custody to the children’s father in 2004, following a com-

plaint he made after Atala moved in with
her same-sex partner. He alleged that exposure to Atala’s lifestyle caused the social,
familial, and educational deterioration of
their children. In granting the children’s
father custody, the Chilean Supreme Court
said that it based its decision on the best
interest of the children. This is the first
case of discrimination based on sexual
orientation that the Inter-American Court
will hear. A favorable result for Atala will
address equal protection under the law
for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) individuals and the rights of nontraditional families.
In its Admissibility Report, the IACHR
found that Atala had claims under the
American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR) because of how the Chilean State
(State) considered her sexual orientation
in the custody proceedings. The IACHR
found that Atala’s rights were violated
under Article 24 of the ACHR, equal protection under the law; Article 11(2), right
to privacy; and Article 17(1), the rights
of the family. The IACHR also acknowledged the potential violation of the rights
of Atala’s children under Articles 19 and
17(4) because the Chilean Supreme Court
did not consider the children’s desire to
stay with Atala. The IACHR referred the
case to the Inter-American Court after it
concluded that the State was responsible
for violations of the ACHR, and had not
complied with its recommendations for
legislative and public policy reform on
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Chile defended its Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the best interests of the
child before the IACHR, which included
removing the children from a living situation that could contribute to “a risk to [the
children’s’] development given the current climate of Chilean society.” The State
further argued that it did not discriminate
against Atala based on sexual orientation,
because its decision was not based on
her relationship with her same-sex partner. Rather, its decision was based on the
effect of her same-sex cohabitation on her
children.
Several civil society organizations submitted amicus curiae briefs in the proceedings before the IACHR contesting the
Chilean Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the best interests of the child. The New York
City Bar Association’s amicus brief argued
that the Court’s decision goes against the
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best interest of the children, because it
“reinforce[s] derogatory stereotypes and
place[s] a judicial seal of approval on the
very homophobic prejudice that creates
and fosters a hostile environment in the
first instance.” The New York Bar’s amicus
brief also cited cases in Argentina, Costa
Rica and Brazil where domestic courts
have protected the custody rights of gay
and transgender parents and condemned
discrimination based on sexual orientation
in custody cases.
Chile’s domestic legal system is divided
on the idea that homosexual parents “deteriorate” children who cohabitate with them.
The Chilean State is defending a decision
by its Supreme Court that is contrary to
the findings of Chile’s own lower courts.
In the Chilean Supreme Court itself, the
decision was contentious, with a three
to two division. A decision by the InterAmerican Court for Atala has the potential for impactful change within Chile. In
response to a 2001 decision by the InterAmerican Court finding Chile in violation
of the ACHR, Chile rewrote part of its
Constitution. The Inter-American Court’s
power to assign reparations could achieve
similar legislative change.
Macarena Saez, a lawyer with Chilean
legal organization Libertades Públicas
A.G., represented Atala in front of the
IACHR. She says that this case has already
achieved something great for the LGBT
community. “What makes history is what
the Commission decides,” she said, “and
the Commission has said that sexual orientation is not grounds for discrimination.”

Justice after 29 Years:
Inter-American Court Finds
Guatemala Responsible for Forced
Disappearance of Mayan Leader
On May 25, 2010, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Inter-American
Court) held that Guatemala violated the
human rights of Florencio Chitay Nech and
his family through his forced disappearance
and the displacement of his family during the 1981 Guatemalan internal armed
conflict. The Inter-American Court’s decision affirmed the State’s responsibility to
investigate forced disappearances regardless of the passage of time, and applied
the freedom of residence to indigenous
children who were displaced due to threats
of violence.
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Chitay Nech was an indigenous
Kaqchikel Maya, a farmer, and a co-op
store owner. In 1973, he became politically active, and in 1977, he was elected as
First Councilman (Deputy Mayor) of San
Martín Jilotepeque in the Department of
Chimaltenango. When the Mayor of San
Martín Jilotepeque was disappeared in
1980, Chitay Nech assumed his position.
While Mayor, there were threats against
Chitay Nech’s life and raids of his home.
After the second raid, Chitay Nech fled
to Guatemala City with his family. It was
there, on April 1, 1981, that Chitay Nech
was abducted in front of his five-year-old
son, Estermerio. His whereabouts are still
unknown.
Two months following the disappearance, Chitay Nech’s family moved back to
San Martín Jilotepeque, but their relatives
refused to take them in for fear of government reprisals. Chitay Nech’s family eventually separated out of necessity.
On the day that Chitay Nech disappeared, his wife, Marta Rodríguez Quex,
reported the incident to the police. Three
weeks after his disappearance it was publicized by the media. Despite the reports, the
Guatemalan police did not seriously assist
the family in locating Chitay Nech. The
Inter-American Court accepted the case,
in part, because of the State’s failure to
conduct an investigation into Chitay Nech’s
forced disappearance.
The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR) urged the InterAmerican Court to find Guatemala responsible for violations of Chitay Nech’s rights
to judicial personality (Article 3), life
(Article 4), humane treatment (Article 5),
personal liberty (Article 7), and participation in government (Article 23) under the
American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR). The IACHR further asserted that
Guatemala violated Chitay Nech and his
family’s rights to a fair trial (Article 8) and
judicial protection (Article 25). They also
alleged that Chitay Nech’s children’s right
to humane treatment (Article 5) and the
rights of the family (Article 17) were violated. Lastly, the IACHR cited violations
of Articles I and II of the Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons (ICFDP).
The victim’s representatives introduced
additional violations and extended the
IACHR’s assertions to other affected parties. Chitay Nech’s wife and sister-in-law

were added to the list of family members
against whom the violations were committed. They claimed violations of the
right to property (Article 21) and the right
to freedom of movement and residence
(Article 22) of the ACHR. In response to
the allegations, the State conceded violations of Articles 4, 5, 7, 17, 19 and 23 of
the ACHR. However, the State continued
to deny violating Articles 3, 8, 25 of the
ACHR and objected to the addition of the
alleged violations of Articles 21 and 22.
The Inter-American Court considered
testimony and documented history in making its decision about the State’s involvement in Chitay Nech’s disappearance.
Thirteen witnesses for the representatives
testified about the circumstances of Chitay
Nech’s disappearance and the use of forced
disappearance against the Maya. One witness testified for the State on the effectiveness of domestic remedies. Relying on this
evidence, the Inter-American Court found
the State responsible for the forced disappearance of Chitay Nech.
Unlawful detention, lack of trial,
prolonged isolation, and secret execution all constitute deprivations of human
rights inherent to forced disappearances.
Guatemala also denied Chitay Nech’s
political freedoms by causing his forced
disappearance. These violations were compounded by his status as an elected official.
The State not only infringed on Chitay
Nech’s political rights, but the political
rights of the community to elect him as an
official. The Inter-American Court found
the State violated the right to political
participation (Article 23(1)(a)) for these
reasons.
The Inter-American Court also ruled
that when the State failed to investigate
Chitay Nech’s disappearance, it violated
his children’s rights to a fair trial and judicial protection under articles 8(1) and 25(1)
under the ACHR and Article 1(b) under the
ICFDP. Through the forced displacement
of the family, the State also violated the
children’s right to residence, movement,
and protection of the family under Articles
22 and 17, and the minor children’s access
to cultural life under Article 19. The InterAmerican Court emphasized that the cultural loss of the family’s Mayan heritage
contributed to the cruelty of their displacement.
The Inter-American Court ordered the
State to make reparations, including mone55

tary compensation, to Chitay Nech and his
family within a year of the decision. The
Inter-American Court also required the
State to notify the citizens of Guatemala
of the Inter-American Court’s judgment
through newspaper articles and radiobroadcasts. Additionally, the Court ordered
Guatemala to begin an investigation to
find and punish the responsible parties for
Chitay Nech’s disappearance, to search for
Chitay Nech, to name a street after him,
and to offer psychological and psychiatric
assistance to the family if desired.
In applying Article 22’s right to freedom of residence to the children displaced
by threats of violence, the Inter-American
Court extended its application beyond
previous boundaries. They acknowledged
that the freedom of residence is violated
when a family is displaced by attempting
to escape threatened violence. This decision additionally reiterated the obligation
of Guatemala to investigate and compensate people whose family members have
been forcibly disappeared, regardless of the
amount of time passed since their disappearance.
EmilyRose Johns, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of Law,
covers the Inter-American System for the Human
Rights Brief.

Inter-American Court Rules in
Favor of Paraguayan Indigenous
Group in Land Rights Case
The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Court) decided its third Paraguayan
indigenous peoples’ land rights case on
August 24, 2010, holding that a portion
of the ancestral lands of the Xákmok
Kásek Indigenous Community should be
returned. Notably, the Court recognized
not only that Article 21 of the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)
protects the indigenous group’s communal
land claim, but also that the community
has a right to reclaim specific ancestral
lands because of their historical, cultural,
and spiritual significance to the indigenous
group.
The Xákmok Kásek people are a multiethnic community of fewer than 300 individuals from Enxet, Sanapaná, and other
ethnic groups who seek to regain 10,700
hectares of land within the Paraguayan
Chaco. The claimed land, part of which
has been declared a protected area by
the Paraguayan government, is currently
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occupied by a privately owned farm in
the northwestern department of Presidente
Hayes. The creation of the protected area
further curtailed the nomadic and traditionally self-sufficient way of life of the
Xákmok Kásek and forced many members
of the community to seek employment on
private farms.
The Xákmok Kásek community has
attempted to reclaim its rights to these
ancestral lands since 1986 and first filed
a complaint with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
in 2001. The IACHR found that the
Paraguayan government was not meeting its international obligations under the
American Convention, in particular with
respect to the rights to property and life.
After the Paraguayan government failed to
comply with the IACHR’s recommendations, it submitted the case to the InterAmerican Court for adjudication in July
2009.
The IACHR submitted that Paraguay
was obligated to recognize the Xákmok
Kásek’s ancestral land claim even if the
State did not have possession of the land
because it was privately owned. Tierraviva,
a non-governmental organization representing the victims, alleged that the
Xákmok Kásek’s lack of land ownership
severely limits the community’s traditional
means of subsistence, which is based on its
nomadic lifestyle. In response, Paraguay
claimed that it had diligently attempted
to enable the Xákmok Kásek people to
exercise their right to land, pointing to
legislation granting indigenous communities access to land and to successful land
reclamation achieved by other indigenous
groups. Although Paraguay also maintained that the community’s claim could be
satisfied by granting alternate traditional
lands, the Court found that Paraguay had
not actually identified suitable and available land. Noting that it had provided
medical and sanitation services as well as
food assistance, Paraguay also rejected the
notion that it could be found liable for the
deaths of the Xákmok Kásek community
members.
In its recent ruling, the Court found
that Paraguay violated the Xákmok Kásek
indigenous community’s rights under the
ACHR, such as the right to life (Article 4),
property (Article 21), humane treatment
(Article 5), legal access and protection
(Articles 8 and 25), and juridical personal-

ity (Article 3), in particular with respect
to documentation of identity. Additionally,
the Court found that the rights of the child
(Article 19) and the right to non-discrimination (Article 1) had been violated. In
its judgment, the Court ordered Paraguay
to return, by August 2013, the 10,700
hectares claimed by the Xákmok Kásek
or to identify another suitable site within
the group’s traditional lands. The judgment
also requested the State to hold a public
ceremony internationally recognizing the
harm suffered by the Xákmok Kásek community. The ruling identified the failings of
Paraguayan legislation in resolving indigenous land claims, particularly when indigenous rights to traditional land conflict
with private property ownership rights. The
ruling advised the Paraguayan government
to revise its legislation or administrative
system so it can address indigenous land
claims successfully and efficiently in the
future. Additionally, the Court urged the
Paraguayan government to immediately
provide medical, psychosocial, and sanitation services to the community, as well
as adequate food, clean water, and educational resources. Lastly, the Court asked
the Paraguayan government to designate
specialists to conduct a needs assessment
with respect to the community’s basic
necessities by February 2011.
The Court’s ruling is an achievement
not only for the Xákmok Kásek but also
for the country’s indigenous population
as a whole. The ruling publicly recognizes both the right to communal property
for the country’s indigenous groups and
the immense need for improved services
and resources for a population historically
underserved and marginalized. The Court’s
recommendations, if fulfilled, will signify
Paraguay’s recognition of the harm to its
indigenous populations and will lead to
enhanced protection of their basic human
rights.

Inter-American Court Holds that
Mexico Violated the Human Rights
of Two Women Raped by Mexican
Military Personnel
The Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (Court) decided two rape cases
in August 2010 brought by indigenous
women against Mexico. In Cantú and
Ortega, the Court held that two women
raped by Mexican soldiers were denied
access to justice when their cases were
placed under military jurisdiction and not
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adequately investigated by either civilian
or military authorities. The Court found
Mexico in violation of the American
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture (Convention on Torture),
and the Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication
of Violence against Women (Convention
on Violence against Women). The Court
concluded that the Mexican military justice
system is inherently unsuited to investigate
human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by members of the Armed Forces.
The women, both members of the
Me’phaa (Tlapanec) indigenous group,
faced similar difficulties following their
rapes. Neither woman received timely and
adequate medical treatment following her
ordeal. Cantú was initially refused services
because of the doctor’s alleged fear of
military retaliation and a lack of proper
medical equipment. Ortega was not provided medical treatment until the day following her rape because there was no
female physician available to examine her.
Neither woman was given a psychological
evaluation. Cantú, only seventeen at the
time of her rape, was left by her husband
and outcast by her community such that
she was forced to relocate to another town.
Ortega and her family were repeatedly
threatened and attacked, and her brother
was murdered for his support and advocacy
on her behalf.
Ortega’s initial attempt to report her
case was denied because it implicated the
military. It took more than two months for
the Public Prosecution Service to determine
which office had jurisdiction over Cantú’s
case. Both cases were eventually transferred from the local Public Prosecution
Service to the Military Prosecution Service
despite appeals by the women for their
cases to remain in the civilian system. After
more than a year of inaction, the victims
filed petitions with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
with the help of several civil society organizations.
The IACHR held that Mexico violated
the women’s rights to non-discrimination,
humane treatment, privacy, and juridical
protection and as a result, made several
recommendations to Mexico. After the
government failed to comply with the
recommendations, the IACHR submitted
the cases of Ortega and Cantú to the Court
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for adjudication in May and August 2009,
respectively. The IACHR’s application
to the Court highlighted that the State’s
failure to investigate the victims’ claims
without unnecessary delays and bring the
perpetrators to justice was rooted in racial
and gender discrimination. Moreover, the
IACHR posited that allowing cases where
both the investigators and the defendants
are members of the same security force
leads to partiality and impunity, which is
more pronounced in a system that lacks
competence in dealing with issues of sexual violence.
In its rulings, the Court found that
Mexico violated the victims’ rights to nondiscrimination, humane treatment, legal
protection, and privacy, Articles 1, 5, 8,
11, and 25 of the ACHR. The Court also
found that Mexico had failed to meet its
obligation to investigate and prosecute
cases of torture under Articles 1, 2, and 6
of the Convention on Torture. Additionally,
it found that Mexico had violated Article

7 of the Convention on Violence against
Women by failing to take adequate steps
to prevent, investigate, and punish violence
against women. Finally, the Court found
that Cantú’s right to special protection as a
minor was violated under Article 19 of the
ACHR. The Court ordered Mexico to pay
$171,000 in reparations to Ortega and her
family members and $147,000 to Cantú.
It also ordered Mexico to investigate the
rapes of both women with due diligence,
to reform the Code of Military Justice
limiting the scope of military jurisdiction
in cases of civilian human rights’ abuses,
and to allocate resources and establish
mechanisms of prevention and protection
for indigenous women and girls, amongst
other measures.
The Court’s rulings indicate the InterAmerican system’s growing focus on
eliminating impunity within the Mexican
military and the lack of transparency in the
military justice system. The ruling mirrors
a 2001 verdict where the Court found that
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Mexico had likewise failed to conduct a
thorough, impartial, and civilian investigation of the rape of three indigenous sisters
by military personnel. These rulings signify the Court’s recognition of the special
vulnerability of indigenous communities
in militarized zones and the need to implement safeguards to mitigate the harmful
effects of military presence and improve
access to assistance and justice, especially
for women. Finally, the Court’s rulings
highlight the continued shortcomings of
the Mexican institutions involved in cases
of human rights violations perpetrated
against indigenous women, from failures to
provide culturally and linguistically competent service provision to victims to coordination amongst investigative and judicial agencies to adequately address sexual
abuse cases without re-victimization.
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